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REPLY TO RIVERTON'S RESPONSE TO THE PETERSEN FAMILY'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Riverton's assertion that the facts surrounding the denial of the Petersen Family's 
Application to rezone their property ("Application") are irrelevant so long as any reasonably 
debatable explanation for the denial exists is simply wrong. See Brief of Appellee Riverton 
City ("Appellee's Brief) at 12. As discussed below, those facts support the Petersen 
Family's claim that Riverton City ("Riverton"), in denying the Application, was improperly 
motivated by a desire to keep the value of the Petersen's Family's property (the "Property") 
low because Riverton had future plans to acquire a portion of the Property through 
condemnation. Riverton's motivation is, therefore, not only relevant in deterirdning the 
validity of the statute but, if proven, invalidates the City Council's denial of the Application. 
Riverton's argument that its motivations are irrelevant is incorrect. 
Riverton also mistakenly asserts that the Petersen Family was required to marshal the 
evidence in support of the denial of the Application in order to demonstrate that the 
decision was not supported. Appellee's Brief at 12-13. The duty to marshal the evidence 
applies only where a party on appeal is challenging a finding of fact by a trial court. See 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Sticking Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^ 24, 140 P.3d 
1200. Since no evidence was taken and no findings of fact were made by the City Council, 
the marshaling requirement has no application in this case. 
Despite its assertion that the facts, and the inferences that may be drawn from the 
facts, are not relevant if any reasonably debatable justification for the denial of the 
Application exists, Riverton also argues its own characterization and interpretation of the 
facts to convince this Court of its position. Further, after asserting that only evidence 
1 
reflected in the City Council record can be considered by this Court in reviewing the denial 
of the Application, Riverton nevertheless spends three pages citing to meeting minutes 
regarding an unrelated 2oning decision in an attempt to persuade this Court that its actions 
were proper. See Appellee's Brief at 17-20. 
Riverton cannot assert that the Petersen Family's conclusions from the record below 
are irrelevant while urging this Court to consider its own characterization of the proceedings. 
Similarly, Riverton cannot assert that the Petersen Family is limited to only the record below, 
but then go outside the record in an attempt to support its own position. 
At the end of the day, Riverton's inconsistent arguments are unavailing. Many courts 
deem, as this Court should, a zoning decision affecting a specific parcel of land a quasi-
judicial action subject to the substantial evidence standard. Riverton's shunning of this 
important issue does not make it disappear. In addition, Riverton's denial of the Application 
for the purpose of depressing the value of the Property so that Riverton could later acquire a 
portion of the Property through condemnation renders the denial unconstitutional and void. 
At the very least, the Petersen Family is entitled to a trial on the issue of whether Riverton 
denied the Application for the purpose of depressing the value of the property so that 
Riverton could later condemn it at a lower value than if the property were rezoned and 
developed. The Petersen Family is also entitled to conduct discovery on the issue of the 
city's animus in denying the application for purposes of the Petersen Family's Equal 
Protection claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETERSEN FAMILY PROPERLY RAISED IN THE 
TRIAL COURT T H E ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 
STANDARD OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE APPLIES 
"An issue is properly preserved in the trial court where the record shows that \1) the 
issue is raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue is specifically raised; and (3) the issue is 
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.'" State v. Chave^Espino^a, 2008 UT App 
191 f 9, 186 P.3d 1023 (quoting Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, U 56, 102 P.3d 774). If 
counsel raises an issue before the trial court and the trial court considers the issue, "the issue 
is preserved for appeal." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,1f 14, 48 
P.3d 968. If a party briefs an issue in the context of summary judgment proceedings before 
the trial court, the issue is properly preserved for appeal. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 
ffl[ 15-17, 2 P.3d 442. There can be no serious question that the substantial evidence 
standard was raised in the court below and is properly raised in this appeal. 
Riverton incorrectly asserts that the issue of the substantial evidence test is a "new 
argument" because at argument the Petersen Family acknowledged the application of the 
reasonably debatable standard to the denial of its Application to rezone the Property. 
Appellee's Brief at 21. That acknowledgment, however, only occurred following a 
preliminary ruling from the trial court rejecting the Petersen Family's arguments for 
application of the substantial evidence standard and dictating application of the reasonably 
debatable standard in this case. Id. at 9-10; R. 446 at pp. 2-4. Although the Petersen Family 
had little choice but to accept the trial court's ruling that the reasonably debatable standard is 
the controlling test under the present law, that concession does not negate the fact that the 
3 
Petersen Family specifically raised the issue of the substantial evidence test in its brief 
opposing Riverton's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 320-23). 1 In the Petersen Family's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Riverton City's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Petersen Family argued that the denial of the application to rezone their property "was not 
based on substantial evidence in the record [as required by] Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)." 
(R. 321). The Petersen Family also asserted, with supporting authority, that because the City 
Council was acting in a "quasi-judicial manner" in denying the application to rezone the 
Property, the decision must accordingly be supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
(R. 320-21). In its brief Riverton expressly acknowledges that those arguments were raised 
below stating: "The Petersen Family argued the district court should overturn the City 
Council's decision because it was not supported by 'substantial evidence.'" Appellee's Brief 
at 8. Indeed, the trial Court's preliminary ruling was directed to, and is an acknowledgment 
of, those very arguments. (R. 446 at pp. 2-3). 
Moreover, even if counsel could be found to have "conceded the standard of review" 
as argued by Riverton, statements by counsel regarding conclusions of law are not binding 
on the Petersen Family or the Court. In re Hansen's Estate, 55 UT 23, U 37, 184 P. 197, 203 
(Utah 1919). ("[W]e think this was but an admission of a legal conclusion and is binding 
neither upon appellant nor upon the court. It is the duty of the court to declare the law as it 
exists, regardless of what a party or his counsel may concede to be the law.") On appeal, 
1
 Rule 11 clearly gives the Petersen Family to make a good faith argument for a change in 
existing law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). 
4 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, regardless of any mistaken assumptions as 
to matters of law by counsel. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 ffij 8, 12, 11 P.3d 277. 
In summary, the Petersen Family specifically and timely raised the issue of the 
application of the substantial evidence test in the trial court in opposition to Riverton's 
motion for summary judgment. The Petersen Family also cited to relevant Utah statutory 
authority in arguing that Riverton's decision on the Application must be supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. The trial court considered and ruled on those arguments, 
rejecting that standard in this case. Lastly, the Petersen Family's counsel acted in accord with 
that ruling in arguing the reasonably debatable standard. (R. 446 at pp. 2-3). The issue of the 
application of the substantial evidence test was raised by the Petersen Family in the trial 
court and is properly before this Court. 
II. UTAH CASE LAW SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZES THAT 
ZONING DECISIONS, LIKE THE DENIAL OF THE 
PETERSEN FAMILY'S APPLICATION, ARE NOT 
LEGISLATIVE IN NATURE 
Although most Utah case law and that relied upon by Riverton holds that zoning 
decisions are legislative and subject to the reasonably debatable standard, at least two Utah 
cases have recognized that the rezoning of a particular parcel is an administrative rather than 
a legislative decision. See Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1967)2; Wilson v. 
Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). In Wilson, the court specifically recognized the 
distinction between the enactment of an original zoning ordinance, which is legislative in 
2
 Many courts have cited Bird for the proposition that individual zoning changes are quasi-
judicial rather than legislative in nature. Utah courts, however, did not cite Bird again until 
1982 in the Wilson case, and the majority of Utah case law has held that zoning decisions 
such as the one at issue here are legislative. 
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nature, and changes to the general zoning in the form of exceptions or variances, which is 
quasi-judicial or administrative in nature. Wilson, 657 P.2d at 253 (citing Walton v. Tracy Loan 
& Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 728-29 (1939) and Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 
440, 446 (Utah 1981)). Although Utah cases have held that zoning decisions are legislative 
for purposes of judicial review, no Utah courts have explained "how amendments to zoning 
ordinances can be legislative on one occasion but administrative on another." See id. at 257 
(Howe, J., dissenting). 
III. CASE LAW CITED BY RIVERTON SUPPORTS THE 
PETERSEN FAMILY'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD SHOULD APPLY 
The cases cited by Riverton show that Utah courts have consistently, with little or no 
review of the decision, upheld a municipality's zoning decision. This pattern supports the 
Petersen Family's argument that the reasonably debatable standard of review is, in effect, no 
review at all. Rather it is simply a rubber stamp for a municipality's zoning decision, 
regardless of the correctness, motivation or evidentiary support for the decision. The cited 
cases are all relatively short opinions in which the court engages in little in-depth review of 
the zoning decisions at issue. Rather, in each case, the court simply summarily affirms the 
zoning decision under the "reasonably debatable" standard. It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to imagine any zoning decision or scenario which would not pass muster under the 
reasonably debatable test. Indeed, no published Utah case could be found by the Petersen 
Family where • a zoning decision has EVER been successfully challenged under the 
reasonably debatable standard. 
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The reasonably debatable standard provides Utah property owners no protection 
whatsoever for their property interests. Instead, a municipality has unfettered discretion to 
make zoning decision affecting property owners, for any reason, valid or not, or for no 
reason at all. The Petersen Family therefore asserts that a change in existing law is 
warranted such that a zoning decision which affects an individual property owner should be 
considered a quasi-judicial decision subject to a higher "substantial evidence" standard rather 
than a "reasonably debatable" test. 
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS CONSTRUE INDIVIDUAL 
ZONING DECISIONS AS QUASI-JUDICIAL AND APPLY 
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD 
For decades, courts and commentators have characterized zoning decisions that 
affect a single parcel of land as quasi-judicial. See Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 480 P.2d 489, 
495-96 (Wash. 1971); Comment, Zoning Amendments—The Product of Judicial or Quasi Judicial 
Action, 33 Ohio St. L.J. 130 (1972).3 The distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial 
acts and the conclusion that individual zoning decisions are quasi-judicial, sometimes 
referred to as the Fasano doctrine, can be summarized as follows: 
A city in enacting a general zoning ordinance, or a planning commission, in 
exercising its primary and principal function . . . in adopting and in annually 
reviewing a comprehensive plan for development of a city, is exercising strictly 
legislative functions. When, however, the focus shifts from the entire city to 
one specific tract of land for which a zoning change is urged, the function 
3
 The American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Housing and Urban Growth 
report contains a series of recommendations, one of which is that, "in granting or denying 
development permission for a specific parcel of land at the request of a particular party is 
engaged in an adjudicatory process, wherein the essentials of procedural due process should 
be followed and judicial bodies reviewing such actions need not accord the traditional 
presumption of legislative validity to such acts." Neil R. Shortlidge, The "Fasano Doctrine": 
Land Use Decisions as Otiasi-Judical Acts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, 
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 3-45 (Janice R. Moss ed., 1985). 
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becomes more quasi-judicial than legislative. While policy is involved, such a 
proceeding requires a weighing of the evidence, a balancing of equities, an 
application of rules, regulations and ordinances to facts, and a resolution of 
specific issues. 
Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 135 (Kan. 1978). Some courts have formulated 
a "test" to determine whether a decision should be considered legislative or quasi-judicial. 
See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771 (Or. 1979). The Neuberger court suggested 
considering three factors in identifying a quasi-judicial determination: (1) the decision is 
directed at a relatively small number of identifiable persons; (2) the action involves the 
application of existing policy to a specific factual setting; and (3) the process is bound to 
result in a decision. Id, at 775. 
Many jurisdictions across the county agree that zoning decisions affecting a single 
property owner or parcel of land are quasi-judicial in nature. In Board of County Commissioners 
of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 471-72 (Fl. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court 
explained the traditional reasonably debatable standard and the reason that its application to 
rezoning decisions affecting one property owner or a small number of property owners is 
flawed: 
The district court of appeal acknowledged that zoning decisions have 
traditionally been considered legislative in nature. Therefore, courts were 
required to uphold them if they could be justified as being "fairly debatable." 
Drawing heavily on Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 Ore. 574, 507 
P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), however, the court concluded that, unlike initial zoning 
enactments and comprehensive rezoning or rezonings affecting a large portion 
of the public, a rezoning action which entails the application of a general rule 
or policy to specific individuals, interests, or activities is quasi-judicial in 
nature. Under the latter circumstances, the court reasoned that a stricter 
standard of judicial review of the rezoning decision was required. The court 
went on to hold: 
8 
Since a property owner's right to own and use his property is constitutionally 
protected, review of any governmental action denying or abridging that right is 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Effective judicial review, constitutional due 
process and other essential requirements of law, all necessitate that the 
governmental agency (by whatever name it may be characterized) applying 
legislated land use restrictions to particular parcels of privately owned lands, 
must state reasons for action that denies the owner the use of his land and 
must make findings of fact and a record of its proceedings, sufficient for 
judicial review of: the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings 
of fact made, the legal sufficiency of the findings of fact supporting the 
reasons given and the legal adequacy, under applicable law (/.<?., under general 
comprehensive zoning ordinances, applicable state and case law and state and 
federal constitutional provisions) of the reasons given for the result of the 
action taken. 
The initial burden is upon the landowner to demonstrate that his petition or 
application for use of privately owned lands, (rezoning, special exception, 
conditional use permit, variance, site plan approval, etc.) complies with the 
reasonable procedural requirements of the ordinance and that the use sought 
is consistent with the applicable comprehensive zoning plan. Upon such a 
showing the landowner is presumptively entitled to use his property in the 
manner he seeks unless the opposing governmental agency asserts and proves 
by clear and convincing evidence that a specifically stated public necessity 
requires a specified, more restrictive, use. After such a showing the burden 
shifts to the landowner to assert and prove that such specified more restrictive 
land use constitutes a taking of his property for public use for which he is 
entitled to compensation under the taking provisions of the state or federal 
constitutions. 
Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added). Applying those principals, the Snyder court concluded: "(1) 
that the Snyders' petition for rezoning was consistent with the comprehensive plan; (2) that 
there was no assertion or evidence that a more restrictive zoning classification was necessary 
to protect the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the general public; and (3) that the denial 
of the requested zoning classification without reasons supported by facts was, as a matter of 
law, arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. at 472. Over the county's argument that the zoning 
was a legislative decision subject to a reasonably debatable standard, the court reasoned: 
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Historically, local governments have exercised the zoning power pursuant to a 
broad delegation of state legislative power subject only to constitutional 
limitations. Both federal and state courts adopted a highly deferential standard 
of judicial review early in the history of local zoning. In Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926), the United 
States Supreme Court held that "if the validity of the legislative classification 
for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be 
allowed to control." 272 U.S. at 388. This Court expressly adopted the fairly 
debatable principle in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean <& Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 
So. 2d 364 (1941). 
Inhibited only by the loose judicial scrutiny afforded by the fairly debatable 
rule, local zoning systems developed in a markedly inconsistent manner. Many 
land use experts and practitioners have been critical of the local zoning 
system. Richard Babcock deplored the effect of "neighborhoodism" and rank 
political influence on the local decision-making process. Richard F. Babcock, 
The Zoning Game (1966). Mandelker and Tarlock recently stated that "zoning 
decisions are too often ad hoc, sloppy and self-serving decisions with well-
defined adverse consequences without off-setting benefits." Daniel R. 
Mandelker and A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in 
Land-Use Law, 24 Urb. Law. 1, 2 (1992). 
Professor Charles Harr, a leading proponent of zoning reform, was an early 
advocate of requiring that local land use regulation be consistent with a legally 
binding comprehensive plan which would serve long range goals, counteract 
local pressures for preferential treatment, and provide courts with a 
meaningful standard of review. Charles M. Harr, "In Accordance With A 
Comprehensive Plan," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955). In 1975, the American Law 
Institute adopted the Model Land Development Code, which provided for 
procedural and planning reforms at the local level and increased state 
participation in land use decision-making for developments of regional impact 
and areas of critical state concern. 
Reacting to the increasing calls for reform, numerous states have adopted 
legislation to change the local land use decision-making process 
Id. at 472-73. 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, the court stated: 
[I]n deference to the policy-making function of a board when acting in a 
legislative capacity, its actions will be sustained as long as they are fairly 
debatable. On the other hand, the rulings of a board acting in its quasi-judicial 
10 
capacity are subject to review by certiorari and will be upheld only if they are 
supported by substantial competent evidence. 
Enactments of original zoning ordinances have always been considered 
legislative. . . . [This] Court [has] held that the passage of an amending zoning 
ordinance was the exercise of a legislative function. However, the amendment 
in that case was comprehensive in nature in that it effected a change in the 
zoning of a large area so as to permit it to be used as locations for multiple 
family buildings and hotels. [Courts have also] held that board action on 
specific rezoning applications of individual property owners was also 
legislative. 
[However,], [i]t is the character of the hearing that determines whether or not 
board action is legislative or quasi-judicial. Generally speaking, legislative 
action results in the formulation of a general rule of policy, whereas judicial 
action results in the application of a general rule of policy. . . . A judicial or 
quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable, and the rights affected 
by them, in relation to past transactions. On the other hand, a quasi-legislative 
or administrative order prescribes what the rule or requirement of 
administratively determined duty shall be with respect to transactions to be 
executed in the future, in order that same shall be considered lawful. But even 
so, quasi-legislative and quasi-executive orders, after they have already been 
entered, may have a quasi-judicial attribute if capable of being arrived at and 
provided by law to be declared by the administrative agency only after express 
statutory notice, hearing and consideration of evidence to be adduced as a 
basis for the making thereof. 
Applying this criterion, it is evident that comprehensive rezonings affecting a 
large portion of the public are legislative in nature. However, we agree with 
the court below when it said: 
Rezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number of persons or 
property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where the decision is 
contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct alternatives presented at a 
hearing, and where the decision can be functionally viewed as policy 
application, rather than policy setting, are in the nature of . . . quasi-judicial 
action . . . . 
Id. at 474 (citations omitted) (emphasis in first paragraph added); See Park of Commerce Assoc, 
v. City ofDelRay Beach, 636 So.2d 12, 15 (Fl. 1994); see also Snyder v. City ofLakewood, 542 P.2d 
371, 372 (Colo. 1975); Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 524 P.2d 84, 90-91 (Haw. 1974); Cooper v. 
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Bd of County, Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947, 952 (Idaho 1980); Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 
590, 591 (Ky. 1982); Uttle v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 631 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Mont 1981); Massey 
v. City of Charlotte and Albemarle "Land Co., 2000 NCBC LEXIS 7, *19-20 (N.G Sup. Ct. April 
17, 2000). 
Even where courts apply a fairly debatable standard, a zoning decision must be 
supported by substantial evidence in the record or it is considered arbitrary, capricious and a 
denial of due process. As explained by one court, the grant or denial of an application to 
change zoning on one particular tract of land: 
requires a weighing of the evidence, a balancing of equities, an application of 
rules, regulations and ordinances to facts, and a resolution of specific issues . . 
. . A mere yes or no vote upon a motion to grant or deny leaves a reviewing 
court, be it trial or appellate, in a quandary as to why or on what basis the 
board took its action. A board, council or commission, in denying or granting 
a specific zoning change, should enter a written order, summarizing the 
evidence before it and stating the factors which it considered in arriving at its 
determination. 
Golden^ 584 P.2d at 135. Jurisdictions that treat a decision on a zoning application as quasi-
judicial generally confine judicial review of the decision to the record. However, where 
allegations of unconstitutionality of the decision exist, a party is permitted to go outside the 
record and present evidence in support of their constitutional claims. See e.g., OR. REV. 
STAT. §197.830(11) (1983). 
V. REGARDLESS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THE 
DENIAL OF THE PETERSEN FAMILY'S APPLICATION 
WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, CONFISCATORY, 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID 
The cases relied upon by Riverton are easily distinguishable and, therefore, inapposite 
in this action. None of the cases relied upon by Riverton involved circumstances in which 
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the municipality was attempting to drive down the price of the property at issue so the 
municipality could acquire the property for its own purposes. Zoning decisions made in 
cases where clear bias exists cannot be upheld. Indeed, even the appearance of impropriety 
in zoning proceedings may be enough to render a decision invalid: 
[W]e start with the premise that comprehensive planning and zoning proposes 
and imposes limitations upon the free and unhampered use of private as well 
as public property, and when such regulations are once enacted, the 
indiscriminate amendment, modification or alteration thereof tends to disturb 
that degree of stability and continuity in the usage of land to which affected 
landowners are entitled to look in the orderly occupation, enjoyment, and 
development of their properties. Perforce, by the very nature of our society, 
the initial imposition of zoning restrictions or the subsequent modification of 
adopted regulations compels the highest public confidence in the 
governmental processes bringing about such action. Circumstances or 
occurrences arising in the course of such processes, which, by their 
appearance, tend to undermine and dissipate confidence in the exercise of the 
zoning power, however innocent they might otherwise be, must be scrutinized 
with care and with the view that the evil sought to be remedied lies no only in 
the elimination of actual bias, prejudice, improper influence or favoritism, but 
also in the curbing of conditions which, by their very existence, tend to create 
suspicion, general misinterpretation, and cast a pall of partiality, impropriety, 
conflict of interest or prejudgment over the proceedings to which they relate. 
Chrobuck, 480 P.2d at 495-96. 
Regardless of the standard of review applied, it is universally accepted that zoning 
decisions which are made to benefit an entity trying to condemn the property by reducing 
the value of the property are void.4 See City ojSan Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos Partnership, 130 
4
 This issue generally arises in condemnation cases, but there is nothing to suggest that the 
zoning principals would not apply equally in a case where only zoning issues are raised. The 
trial court expressed concern regarding this issue at oral argument on the motion for 
summary judgment below. At the hearing, the trial court stated: "Implicit in [the Petersen 
Family's] argument is that if the city council was in part motivated by a desire to acquire the 
drainage basin and that was the reason why they did not change the zoning, that there's 
something wrong with that. Is that a problem? I mean, it seems to me - I see a big 
difference between the city council down-zoning the properties so they can acquire it 
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Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 121-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). When zoning decisions are made so a public 
entity can acquire property at low cost, such decisions have been held to be "discriminatory, 
confiscatory and invalid." Id. at 122. Where the entity responsible for zoning is also the 
body responsible for condemnation, "it is practical and logical" that zoning decisions which 
affect property value for purposes of condemnation should be held invalid. See id. at 122. A 
municipal entity intending to condemn property "cannot enact restrictions on property it 
seeks to condemn for the express purpose of preventing development and thereby freeze or 
depress property values." Id. at 123.5 See also United States v. Certain "Lands in Truro, Barnstable 
County, Commonwealth of Mass., 476 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass 1979); Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. State 
Highway Admin. oftheMd. Dept. ofTransp., 731 A.2d 948, 952 (Md. Ct. 1999) ("[T]here seems 
to be a general agreement among the authorities which have considered the question that 
zoning cannot be used as a substitute for eminent domain proceedings so as to defeat the 
constitutional requirement for the payment of just compensation in the case of a taking of 
private property for public use by depressing values and so reducing the amount of damages 
to be paid."). 
As argued by Riverton, the subjective motivations behind a municipality's zoning 
decisions are generally not considered in reviewing the decision. See Appellee's Brief at 32-
cheaper and leaving it alone so that they don't have to pay more to acquire it in the future." 
(R. 446 at p. 15). 
5
 When Riverton moves forward with the condemnation of the Petersen Family's property, 
the Petersen Family will have a claim against Riverton for inverse condemnation "resulting 
from the disguised taking in the form of zoning and for the actual taking of the property." 
Rancho Penasquitos, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122; Dep't of Public Works v. So. Pac. Transp. Co., 109 
Cal. Rptr. 525, 528-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (property owner may bring one action for inverse 
condemnation and challenging zoning ordinance which depressed value of condemned 
property). 
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33. That general rule, however, does not apply where the motivation relates to the 
municipality's interest in keeping the value of the property low for the purpose of obtaining 
it through condemnation. Riverton's argument in that regard fails. See Robertson v. City of 
Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604, 610 (D. Or. 1961) ("[I] is conceded that the motives of a legislative 
municipal zoning authority such as Salem's Council is not subject to a judicial inquiry in 
adjudicating the validity of a zoning ordinance restricting land uses . . . . On the other hand, 
it is not improper to judicially investigate the 'real purpose, the object and the operative 
effect' of such an ordinance when laboring to determine its reasonableness."). Even under a 
reasonably debatable standard, "the decisive question becomes: What matter of public 
interest or general welfare of the enacting society is served by prohibiting ont of its members 
from using his property [for a specific purpose], when his neighbor directly across a city 
street is permitted to do so?" Id. 
A city may not purport to "exercise its police power by enacting a zoning ordinance 
[which] has in reality discriminated against a particular parcel or parcels of land in order to 
depress their value with a view to future takings in eminent domain." Dep't of Public Works, 
109 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (citing Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 12.322). In such a 
situation, the property owner "may attack the validity of the invalid zoning ordinance." Id. 
The fraudulent intent behind a zoning ordinance which is meant to depress the value of 
property so as to reduce the damages paid by the condemning public entity renders the 
zoning ordinance invalid. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 380 A.2d 216, 
220 (Md. 1977). "A city cannot 'freeze' property thereby preventing the owner from 
improving it so that he may enjoy a beneficial use thereof only because the city may, in the 
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future need such property" for public use. Masheter v. Mariemont, Inc., 302 N.E.2d 583, 587 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1971). "Where the real purpose of the enactment [of a zoning ordinance] 
was to depress or limit property values in order to minimize the costs of acquisition of such 
property in anticipated condemnation proceedings the courts have not been reluctant to 
declare such ordinances unconstitutional and void." Dep't of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Exch. 
NafIBank, 334 N.E.2d 810, 819 (111. App. Ct. 1975). 
In the record evidence supports the Petersen Family's argument that the Application 
was denied in order to keep property values down so the City could later condemn a portion 
of the property at less than fair market value. That alone, regardless of the standard of 
review applied, renders the decision arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional and void. At the 
very least, the Petersen Family should be permitted to conduct discovery, as it requested in 
its Rule 56 Motion, regarding Riverton's motivations in denying the Application. See Nay/or 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 301, 410 P.2d 764 (1966) (stating that a party was 
allowed to conduct discovery and present evidence at trial to show zoning decision arbitrary 
and capricious). 
VI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE PETERSEN FAMILY'S 
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCEES CLAIMS WAS 
INCORRECT AND SHOULD BE REVERSED 
Relying on Gardner v. Board of County Commissioners, 2008 UT 6, 178 P.3d 893, Riverton 
asserts that the Petersen Family cannot maintain its Equal Protection claim because a 
rational basis can be articulated for Riverton's denial of the Application. Appellee's Brief at 
34-35. In Gardner, this Court, while stating that a relatively low level rational basis test 
applied, held that summary judgment is inappropriate where there is "evidence of dissimilar 
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treatment and an allegation, with some evidentiary support, of malicious or bad faith intent 
on the part of [public] officials." Id. at ^ 38. Riverton itself raises issues of fact with respect 
to the Equal Protection claim by citing to evidence outside the record regarding the 
"property across the street" and asserting that the Petersen Family was not, in fact, treated 
differently than other similarly situation property owners. See Appellee's Brief at 39. 
The trial court erred in disposing of the Petersen Family's Equal Protection claim on 
summary judgment and denying the Rule 56(f) request to conduct discovery. The trial 
court's ruling should accordingly be reversed and the Petersen Family should be permitted to 
conduct discovery and, if appropriate, proceed to trial on its Equal Protection claim. 
With respect to the Petersen Family's Due Process claims, Riverton asserts that the 
Due Process claims were properly dismissed because the Petersen Family has failed to 
establish that it had a protectable property interest for purposes of that claim. Specifically, 
Riverton asserts that the Petersen Family has not identified anything that limits Riverton's 
discretion in making zoning decisions. See Appellee's Brief at 40-41. Because Riverton's 
planned condemnation of the Property is at issue, statutory limits on the City's ability to 
exercise its eminent domain power exist. Riverton does not have the unfettered ability, 
under the guise of zoning, to attempt to condemn the Petersen's Family property at lower 
than market value. Rather, Riverton is limited by the requirements of the Utah and United 
States Constitutions and by Utah statute that private property may only be taken if just 
compensation is paid to the property owner. See U.S. CONST., amend, v; UTAH CONST, art. 
I §22; Utah Code Ann. § 76B-6-511-12. Thus, Riverton's assertion that the Petersen Family 
can point to nothing limiting Riverton's zoning authority is simply incorrect. 
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Because Riverton's zoning authority as it relates to its attempt to condemn the 
property is statutorily and constitutionally limited, the Petersen Family has identified a 
protectable property interest in this case. Because the Petersen Family has a cognizable 
property interest as set forth in detail above, the fact that a rational basis may exist for the 
denial of the Application does not, as asserted by Riverton, automatically render the denial 
valid. Rather, the decision, if in fact it was made for Riverton's benefit in obtaining the 
property at a lower value, is arbitrary, capricious, illegal and deprives the Petersen Family of 
their property rights without due process of law. See Robertson, 191 F. Supp. at 612 (freezing 
the use of land so a municipality may acquire the property at a depressed value is "arbitrary 
and discriminatory and that is, in effect, an attempt on the part of [the municipality] to use 
its police power to take Robertson's property without due process of law" and renders the 
decision void). At the very least, the Petersen Family is entitled to discovery and a trial on 
that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petersen Family properly raised below and is arguing before this Court for a 
change in Utah law. Specifically, the reasonably debatable standard is no standard at all and 
provides no protection whatsoever for Utah property owners. Because a zoning decision 
which affects a single property owner or parcel of property is a quasi-judicial decision, it 
should be subject to a substantial evidence standard. Many other jurisdictions and scholars 
agree that such a standard is more appropriate for individual zoning decisions than the fairly 
debatable standard. This Court should accordingly take this opportunity to make a much 
needed change in the standard of review. If Riverton's denial of the Application is subject to 
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a substantial evidence standard, it cannot stand as the evidence in the record supports a grant 
of the Application. 
Even if this Court declines to change the law, the trial court's decision was erroneous 
and should nonetheless be reversed and set for trial. It is well-settled that zoning decisions 
which are made to drive down property values so that a municipality may acquire the 
property through condemnation are unconstitutional and void. Thus, regardless of the 
standard applied to the denial, the denial is arbitrary, capricious, illegal and unconstitutional 
on the ground that Riverton denied the Application so it could later acquire a portion of the 
property at less than full market value. 
At the very least, the trial court erred in denying the Petersen Family's Rule 56(f) 
request. The denial of the Rule 56(f) motion should be reversed and the Petersen Family 
allowed to conduct discovery on relevant issues, including, but not limited to, Riverton's 
motivation for the denial of the Application. That discovery goes to not only the validity of 
the denial but also to the Petersen Family's Equal Protection and Due Process Claims. 
The Petersen Family respectfully requests that the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Riverton and the denial of the Petersen Family's Rule 56(f) motion be 
reversed in their entirety, with instructions that the Petersen Family may conduct discovery 
on all relevant issues, and proceed with a trial on its claims. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 2009. 
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